Qatar LNG Force Majeure in 2026 — Ras Laffan Damage, Lost Cargoes and Restart

What is QatarEnergy's force majeure and how long will it last?

Force majeure is a contract clause that excuses a seller when events beyond its control stop delivery. QatarEnergy invoked it on 4 March, after Iranian attacks on 2 March hit its Ras Laffan and Mesaieed sites and LNG production was halted ^[1]. Downstream output of urea, polymers, methanol and aluminium was also affected ^[1].

The notice has since been rolled forward roughly once a month ^[5]. On 24 March the company declared force majeure on some long-term contracts for up to five years, naming buyers in Italy, Belgium, South Korea and China ^[4]. In late September it told buyers in Pakistan and Bangladesh that cancellations would run through November. Italy's Edison said its deliveries were suspended until early December ^[5,6].

The latest step came this week. Edison said QatarEnergy had pushed its force majeure to the end of December. Buyers in Pakistan and Bangladesh were told their notices would also run to year-end ^[7].

What damage did Ras Laffan suffer in 2026?

The worst damage came in a second wave. Iranian missiles struck Ras Laffan Industrial City on 18 and 19 March, Anadolu Agency reported ^[2]. LNG Trains 4 and 6 were damaged, with combined capacity of 12.8 million tonnes per annum (mtpa), about 17% of Qatar's exports ^[2]. ExxonMobil holds 34% of Train 4 and 30% of Train 6 ^[2].

Two of Qatar's 14 trains were hit, along with one of its two gas-to-liquids (GTL) plants ^[3]. QatarEnergy chief executive Saad al-Kaabi put the lost revenue at about $20 billion a year ^[4]. Rebuilding the damaged units would cost about $26 billion, Khaleej Times reported ^[3].

Repair estimates have narrowed. In March, al-Kaabi spoke of three to five years ^[2]. In September he said the two trains would take about three years, while the Pearl GTL unit would finish repairs in the first quarter of 2027 ^[16].

The damage reaches beyond LNG. Qatar expected condensate exports to fall by about 24%, helium output by about 14% and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by about 13% ^[2,3].

How far have Qatari LNG exports fallen?

The collapse has been almost total. Qatar shipped 18 LNG cargoes in the first six months of the war, against 509 in the same period of 2025, a fall of 96% ^[8]. S&P Global data showed three LNG carrier transits of Hormuz in August, against 18 in July, and none from 17 August to 1 September ^[10].

Loadings picked up in the autumn. Kpler counted 20 cargoes in September and 13 in the first 13 days of October. Only four of those 13 had active transponders; the rest were verified by satellite imagery and other signals ^[9]. In September al-Kaabi said QatarEnergy was producing "very little LNG" ^[16].

The wider gap is large. The IEA says Qatari and Emirati supply has fallen by more than 300 million cubic metres a day since 1 March. Higher output elsewhere has offset around three-quarters of that loss ^[19].

Who lost Qatari LNG supply?

Europe's exposure was modest overall but concentrated. Qatar supplied 8% of EU LNG imports and 4% of total EU gas imports before the war, according to the Bruegel think tank ^[12]. It supplied a third of Italy's LNG imports in 2025, a quarter of Belgium's and almost a fifth of Poland's ^[12].

The damaged trains map onto named customers. Train 4 supplied Edison in Italy and EDF Trading in Belgium. Train 6 supplied KOGAS in South Korea, EDF Trading and Shell in China ^[3].

South Asia has been hit hardest. Qatar supplied about 4.15 million tonnes of the nearly 7 million tonnes Bangladesh imported in 2025. By early July it had received no cargo loaded at Ras Laffan since the war began, and had bought 35 spot cargoes instead ^[13]. In Pakistan, spot cargoes cost roughly $16–17 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in July, against about $10–12 under QatarEnergy's long-term contracts ^[14].

Why is QatarEnergy buying US LNG from Cheniere and Woodside?

Qatar is building a trading portfolio that does not depend on Hormuz. On 22 October it signed two agreements to buy up to 4 mtpa from Cheniere's Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi plants. Deliveries are on a free-on-board (FOB) basis from 2031 to 2054 ^[15].

A week later it agreed a 20-year deal for up to 3 mtpa from Woodside's Louisiana LNG project. Deliveries start when the project's second train runs, with first cargoes expected in 2030 ^[7]. Al-Kaabi said the volumes make QatarEnergy "the largest buyer of LNG from the US". He expects more deals by year-end at volumes "much higher" than those agreed so far ^[7].

These deals do not replace lost volumes this winter. The nearer-term hedge is Golden Pass in Texas, QatarEnergy's joint venture with ExxonMobil. Its first train started in March and the plant is expected to produce 18 million tonnes a year once fully running ^[16]. Al-Kaabi has ruled out pipelines around Hormuz, saying any regional infrastructure could be targeted ^[7].

What happens to the North Field expansion?

The expansion was meant to drive the next wave of global supply. North Field East and North Field South are expected to lift Qatar's capacity from 77 to 126 mtpa ^[18]. In May, ConocoPhillips said delays were "more likely measured in months rather than years" ^[18].

The schedule has since slipped. In September al-Kaabi said the first North Field East train would start in the first half of 2027, having previously been expected in 2026 ^[17]. North Field South is due in 2028 ^[17]. Equipment for the project still cannot reach Qatar, and further trains "will depend a lot on the Hormuz Strait", he said ^[16,17].

The IEA says the damage in Qatar is delaying the expected LNG supply wave, with effects through 2026 and 2027 ^[19]. Wood Mackenzie's "Extended Disruption" scenario sees multi-year delays to 60 mtpa of Gulf capacity under construction ^[20].

How have JKM and TTF prices reacted?

Asian and European benchmarks have moved together. On 2 September, S&P Global's Platts assessed the October Japan-Korea Marker (JKM) at $25.908/MMBtu, its highest since late 2022 ^[10]. JKM reached the high $29s for December delivery on 16 October ^[11].

The Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) rose to $28.9/MMBtu on the same day ^[11]. Kpler said Asian LNG had moved from a $0.30 premium to a $2.21 discount to TTF by 14 October ^[9]. This week TTF rose above €95 per megawatt-hour, close to its highest since December 2022 ^[7].

US gas remains far cheaper. Henry Hub was $3.1/MMBtu on 16 October ^[11]. That spread is what makes US offtake attractive to a seller like QatarEnergy.

What to watch: how could Qatari LNG restart?

• A peace deal. Al-Kaabi says undamaged facilities could return to full production within a week of a deal, if ships are available ^[7]. In September he spoke of "a couple of weeks" after Hormuz reopens ^[17].
• Repairs. The two damaged trains need about three years, so roughly 17% of capacity would stay offline well after any reopening ^[7,16].
• Further extensions. QatarEnergy has updated buyers about once a month; the next notice will show whether force majeure runs into 2027 ^[5,7].
• Scenarios. Wood Mackenzie's "Quick Peace" case kept LNG markets tight until summer 2027. Its "Extended Disruption" case, with Hormuz shut through 2026, saw prices potentially reaching $40/MMBtu if the conflict restarts ^[20].
• Medium-term supply. The IEA's estimate of a 140 bcm cumulative loss to 2030 shows the outage reaches well beyond this winter ^[19].

Alupetra follows LNG, gas and Gulf energy flows daily from its offices in Istanbul, London and Dubai.