Hormuz Bypass Pipelines Explained — East-West, ADCOP, Jask and the New Routes

Which pipelines can bypass the Strait of Hormuz?

In 2025 the strait carried 19.87 million barrels a day (mb/d) of oil ^[1]. Only two pipelines can move large volumes around it. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline runs from Abqaiq to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) runs 400 km from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman ^[1].

Before the war, the International Energy Agency (IEA) put spare capacity on the two lines at 3.5–5.5 mb/d. It warned that the logistics of rerouting large flows "have not been robustly tested" ^[1]. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) uses a narrower figure: about 4.7 mb/d of bypass capacity in a disruption ^[2].

Everyone else depends on the strait. The IEA identifies no bypass for Iraq, Kuwait or Qatar ^[1]. In 2025 these three shipped a combined 7.43 mb/d of oil through Hormuz (our sum of IEA figures) ^[1].

Gas has no bypass at all. Qatar and the UAE can export LNG only from their coastal liquefaction plants. The Dolphin pipeline, which carried about 20.5 billion cubic metres from Qatar to the UAE and Oman in 2025, has little spare room ^[1]. QatarEnergy has rejected export pipelines through neighbouring countries on commercial and technical grounds ^[18].

How much of the bypass capacity is being used in 2026?

The Saudi line has done most of the work. Its design capacity is 5 mb/d. Aramco reported in March 2025 that it had been raised to 7 mb/d, though sustained flows at that rate had not been tested ^[1]. In its first-quarter 2026 results, Aramco said the pipeline had reached its maximum of 7 mb/d ^[8].

Use has swung widely. About 2 mb/d was in use in early 2026 ^[1]. Kpler estimated roughly 5.5 mb/d before the September attack, including about 4.5 mb/d for export from Yanbu ^[9]. Flows fell to about 2 mb/d in August, as Houthi attacks made the Red Sea route harder to use ^[6]. On 6 October Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said throughput was back at 5.8 mb/d ^[6].

The pipeline has also become a target. In April a strike on a pumping station cut flows by 700,000 b/d; the ministry said capacity was back to about 7 mb/d on 12 April ^[7]. On 10 September drones launched from Iraq damaged pumping stations and halted loadings at Yanbu for about two weeks ^[8,10]. Kpler said at least one station was extensively damaged and a temporary bypass was being installed ^[9]. On 26 October the Houthis claimed new attacks on pumping stations; Saudi Arabia had not confirmed them ^[10].

Why is Yanbu, not the pipeline, the limit?

A pipeline is only as useful as the port at its end. Kpler puts sustainable export capacity at Yanbu at around 4.5–5 Mbd. About 1.5 Mbd comes from Yanbu North Crude Terminal and about 3.0 Mbd from Muajjiz ^[4]. The terminals, not the line, are the binding constraint ^[4].

Domestic demand takes another slice. About 2 mb/d of the line's flow goes to west-coast refineries and power plants, leaving at most about 5 mb/d for other uses ^[8]. The 400,000 b/d SAMREF refinery at Yanbu cut runs by around half after the September attack ^[9].

Loadings show the ceiling. Saudi Red Sea crude loadings were 0.75 mb/d before the war and 4.3 mb/d in June, according to Kpler ^[3]. They fell to about 1.5 mb/d in August and recovered to about 2.9 mb/d in early September, just before the attack on the pipeline ^[8].

Security adds cost. War-risk insurance for Saudi-linked tankers loading at Yanbu tripled to about 3% of vessel value from under 1% in early July, OilPrice reported, citing Reuters ^[9]. Yanbu cargoes must also pass the Bab el-Mandeb or sail north through Suez.

How has the UAE used ADCOP and Fujairah?

ADCOP was built for 1.5 mb/d and now carries close to 1.8 mb/d, according to the IEA. Before the war the UAE sent about 1.1 mb/d of its own crude through it, leaving up to 700,000 b/d of headroom ^[1]. Kpler says UAE loadings via the pipeline to Fujairah rose from 1.1 mb/d to 2.7 mb/d ^[3]. That figure likely includes some barrels brought by shuttle tanker.

Fujairah itself has been hit. In mid-March a drone attack set off fires and ADNOC suspended crude loading; two of the port's three single-point moorings stayed operational ^[12]. The port is a critical exit for about one million barrels a day of the UAE's Murban crude ^[12].

What about Iran's Goreh–Jask line and Iraq's northern route?

Iran's bypass is mostly unused. The Goreh–Jask pipeline has a reported capacity of 1 mb/d, but the IEA described it as effectively non-operational before the war ^[1]. The EIA puts its effective capacity at around 0.3 mb/d ^[2]. S&P Global recorded about 64,600 b/d from Jask in March, the first exports there in 2026. Satellite images showed tankers at the Jask mooring at least six times between March and July ^[15].

Iraq's northern line runs to Ceyhan in Türkiye. Kpler puts its theoretical capacity at 1.6 Mbd but says physical degradation and Iraq's south-heavy output keep it well below that ^[5]. Flows were around 220,000 b/d in early September, according to Shafaq News ^[16]. A one-year Iraq–Türkiye deal signed on 1 August provides for at least 750,000 b/d of exports through the northern route ^[16]. We cover that corridor in Türkiye Energy Hub in 2026.

Other Iraqi options are older or further off. Kpler says a restart of the Iraq–Saudi pipeline (IPSA) is unlikely in the near term, and a Kirkuk–Baniyas revival is unviable for now ^[5].

Which new routes are planned, and when could they open?

The UAE is furthest ahead. Its 300 km West-East pipeline, costing $3 billion, was reported to be 50% complete in July ^[4]. ADNOC chief executive Sultan Al Jaber said in May it was "almost 50 per cent complete" and being accelerated toward 2027 ^[13]. Abu Dhabi says it will double export capacity through Fujairah ^[14]. Kpler expects a material effect from mid-2027, lifting UAE bypass capacity from about 1.8 Mbd to as much as 3.6 Mbd ^[4]. A separate Hamriyah–Fujairah line is in early planning ^[5].

Saudi Arabia is studying bigger steps. Aramco chief executive Amin Nasser said on 22 October that studies include raising the East-West line from 7 to 10 mb/d ^[11]. Kpler sees a 1–2 Mbd expansion as feasible only from 2028, after Yanbu is debottlenecked ^[4]. Aramco is also studying a 1,000–1,200 km pipeline to Duqm in Oman, estimated at $7 billion. No route, contract or timetable has been announced ^[11].

Iraq's plans are the slowest. Feasibility studies cover routes from Basra via Haditha to Ceyhan or to Baniyas in Syria; each would take three to five years once construction starts ^[4]. A Basra–Aqaba line to Jordan would carry up to 1 million b/d. Iraq allocated $1.5 billion for 2026, starting with the Basra–Haditha section ^[17]. Cost estimates differ: a former Iraqi prime minister put it at nearly $5 billion, while Kpler estimates $10 billion ^[5,17].

What to watch

• Attacks on bypass infrastructure. Pumping stations, Yanbu and Fujairah have all been hit in 2026, so the workarounds are themselves exposed ^[7,10,12].
• Yanbu throughput. Loadings near 4.5–5 mb/d would show the Saudi system at its practical ceiling ^[4].
• UAE West-East start-up. Watch for commissioning news through 2027 and for the matching Fujairah port expansion ^[4,13].
• Saudi decisions. A final decision on 10 mb/d or on Duqm would signal a long-term shift in export routes ^[11].
• Iraq. Northern flows against the 750,000 b/d contract level, and funding for Basra–Haditha ^[16,17].

Alupetra tracks Gulf export routes, tanker freight and crude benchmarks daily from Istanbul, London and Dubai.