Iran’s Oil Production and Exports in 2026: Volumes, Capacity and Trends

Iran's oil resources and production capacity

Iran is one of the world's most important holders of oil and gas resources. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) ranks it third in the world for proved crude oil reserves, with 24% of the Middle East's reserves and 12% of the global total at the end of 2023. Iran also holds the second-largest natural gas reserves in the world, about 16% of the global total ^[1]. Its South Pars field makes up around a third of the world's largest gas reservoir. Iran produced 276 billion cubic metres of gas in 2024 and used 94% of it at home ^[2].

The International Energy Agency (IEA) puts Iran's sustainable crude production capacity at 3.8 million barrels a day (mb/d) ^[3]. Output has come close to that level before. In 2018, before US oil sanctions were reimposed, Iran was producing about 3.78–3.80 mb/d, according to S&P Global Platts ^[4].

Most production comes from onshore fields. According to Robin Mills of Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), the Khuzestan and Zagros heartland produces about 2.2 mb/d. The West Karoun fields add about 500,000 b/d, against a target of 1 mb/d, and offshore fields in the Gulf about 500,000 b/d. Iran also produces about 1.3 mb/d of condensate and natural gas liquids (NGLs) from its gas fields ^[5]. Because its output is already constrained, Iran is exempt from OPEC+ production cuts ^[1,3].

How has Iran's oil production changed since 2016?

Iran's oil production and exports have moved with the sanctions cycle. After the 2016 nuclear agreement lifted restrictions, exports roughly doubled to about 2.2–2.4 mb/d, and Europe took around a third of them ^[4].

The United States reimposed oil sanctions in 2018, and import waivers for buyers ended in 2019. Crude loadings briefly fell towards 170,000 b/d, according to Vortexa ^[6]. The EIA estimates that crude and condensate exports averaged just 0.4 mb/d in 2020 ^[1].

A steady recovery followed:

• Production: EIA estimates put Iranian crude output at 2.87 mb/d in 2023 and 3.31 mb/d in 2024 ^[7]. CGEP estimates that output held between 3.2 and 3.3 mb/d during 2025 and early 2026 ^[5].
• Exports: Crude and condensate exports recovered to nearly 1.4 mb/d in 2023 and averaged 1.5 mb/d in the first eight months of 2024 ^[1]. Vortexa says flows had rebuilt to roughly 1.5–2 mb/d by 2024–25 ^[6]. Kpler data put average crude exports at 1.68 mb/d in 2025 ^[8].

On the eve of the 2026 conflict, Iran was therefore producing more than 3 mb/d of crude and exporting about half of it.

How did the 2026 conflict affect Iran's oil production?

The regional conflict began on 28 February 2026 ^[6]. At first, exports held up. Kpler recorded crude exports of 1.84 mb/d in March and 1.71 mb/d in April ^[8]. Vortexa estimated nearly 1.9 mb/d in March and about 1.34 mb/d in April ^[2]. Damage to onshore processing facilities in March cut South Pars condensate output by about 100,000–120,000 b/d, and crude output appears to have fallen to 3.06 mb/d that month ^[5].

The decisive change came on 13 April, when the United States began a naval blockade of Iranian ports ^[6]. Before the war, Iran shipped about 90% of its crude exports through the Kharg Island terminal ^[2,8]. With exports constrained, storage began to fill. In late April, a Kpler analyst estimated that Iran's remaining onshore storage could hold only about 20 days of production ^[8].

Production then fell. Estimates differ by source, but all show a steep decline:

• Reuters survey: 2 mb/d in May, down from 3 mb/d in April ^[2].
• Bloomberg survey: 2.34 mb/d in May, a five-year low and 710,000 b/d lower than in April ^[9].
• OPEC secondary sources: 2.45 mb/d in June and 2.48 mb/d in July ^[10].
• IEA: 2.72 mb/d in July and 2.16 mb/d in August ^[3].

CGEP noted in April that output might need to fall by up to half of pre-war levels to avoid filling storage. It judged, however, that such shut-ins were unlikely to cause serious technical problems or reduce production capacity permanently ^[5].

Iranian crude exports in 2026: from 1.8 mb/d to zero

Iranian crude exports in 2026 have followed the blockade closely. Vortexa estimated crude and condensate exports in May at about 209,000 b/d, the lowest in at least six years ^[2]. Shipments recovered after a ceasefire in mid-June. Vortexa estimated that about 30 million barrels, or 1.35 mb/d, were loaded between 15 June and 6 July ^[11].

The restrictions on Iranian exports returned in July ^[6]. According to Vortexa and Kpler estimates reported by Reuters, exports fell to about 740,000 b/d in July and to 220,000–255,000 b/d in August ^[12]. Kpler put loadings at Kharg at 251,000 b/d in August ^[10].

September brought a new low. Kpler recorded no Iranian crude exports at all, the first such month since it began tracking flows in 2013 ^[13].

Iran entered the blockade with large volumes of crude at sea, which kept deliveries to Asia going for several months ^[6]. Reuters reported that total Iranian crude afloat fell from 135 million barrels to 107 million by late August ^[12]. Kpler estimated that crude held on vessels outside the blockade zone fell from about 100 million barrels at the end of July to 45 million barrels by early October ^[13].

Refined products, LPG and domestic demand

Iran is also a significant exporter of refined products and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). The EIA estimates that product exports exceeded 1 mb/d in 2023, up from about 820,000 b/d in 2022 ^[1]. Kpler put fuel exports, including LPG, at about 820,000 b/d in 2025, slightly below the 2024 level ^[2].

Domestic demand absorbs a large share of supply. Before the war, Iran's refineries processed about 2.1 mb/d of crude, out of 2.4 mb/d of capacity, and domestic oil consumption averaged around 2 mb/d ^[5]. Estimates of refining capacity vary. Consultancy FGE puts it at 2.6 mb/d ^[2], while the EIA counted about 2.1 mb/d of crude distillation and 0.6 mb/d of condensate splitting at the start of 2024 ^[1]. Domestic refining therefore takes a large share of Iran's crude output, whatever happens to exports.

Export infrastructure is extensive. The EIA estimates Iran's oil-loading capacity for exports at more than 8 mb/d. The Goureh–Jask pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 1 mb/d but carried only about 300,000 b/d as of mid-2024 ^[1].

Outlook: Iran's place in the world oil market

Iran's supply matters well beyond its borders. Even after this year's decline, it was OPEC's third-largest producer in July, pumping about 2.5% of global crude output ^[10]. Before the war, its exports went mainly to Chinese independent refiners ^[2]. Without Iranian barrels, those refiners have bought Iraqi and Qatari crude at premiums of about $12–20 a barrel to ICE Brent, as well as cargoes from West Africa, Canada and Colombia ^[13].

The timing of any recovery depends on diplomacy. In September the IEA said the continuing impasse in negotiations between the United States and Iran was delaying the normalisation of Gulf oil flows into 2027. It also noted that flows through the Strait of Hormuz remained severely constrained ^[3]. We review shipping conditions there in our analysis of chokepoint risk in Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Bosphorus. The EIA expects most production in the Middle East to return to pre-conflict averages by the end of the second quarter of 2027 ^[14].

The upstream base appears resilient. CGEP estimates that, once shut-in fields restart, Iran could restore about 70% of production promptly and regain most of its pre-war capacity within a few months ^[5]. Key indicators to watch include:

• Diplomacy: progress in US–Iran negotiations and any change to the blockade.
• Tanker-tracking data: monthly loadings at Kharg, as reported by Kpler and Vortexa.
• Production estimates: IEA, OPEC secondary sources and survey data, which have differed by several hundred thousand barrels a day this year.
• Asian demand: whether Chinese independent refiners switch back to Iranian grades once supply returns.

Alupetra follows Iranian supply as part of its market analysis from Istanbul, London and Dubai, and does not deal with sanctioned persons, entities or vessels.