Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea, 2026 — Bab el-Mandeb, Suez and Tanker Traffic

Why did Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping resume in 2026?

An informal truce between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi movement, which controls Yemen's capital Sanaa, had held since April 2022 ^[1]. It never became a full peace agreement. In mid-July it came under strain. Air strikes by Yemen's internationally recognised government hit Sanaa airport to stop an Iranian plane from landing, and the Houthis blamed Riyadh ^[1]. On 13 July they struck Abha airport in southern Saudi Arabia. Nadwa Al Dawsari of the Middle East Institute told The National the truce was "hanging by a thread" ^[1].

On 20 July the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia ^[2]. They said Saudi-linked tankers would be targeted for violating their "navigation ban" ^[2]. The timing mattered for oil markets. Since the US–Iran war began in late February, Saudi Arabia has shifted exports to Yanbu on the Red Sea via its East-West pipeline ^[1]. The blockade put that bypass route at risk.

The war on land escalated in September. The Houthis seized the port city of Mokha after several days of fighting with pro-government forces, extending their control towards the Bab el-Mandeb ^[8]. An unnamed Houthi source told The National the group would "target oil lifelines in the Red Sea" ^[8]. By October, Arab News reported, the Houthis held Yemen's entire Red Sea coastline, including the strait ^[20].

Which ships have been attacked since the naval ban?

The first confirmed hit came on 22 July. The Saudi Press Agency said the tanker Encelia had been struck and its crew were safe. The Houthis also claimed an attack on the tanker Layla ^[2]. About a week later they said they had fired ballistic missiles at the Saudi tanker NCC Ghazal. The UK Maritime Trade Operations centre (UKMTO) reported an explosion near a tanker in the Red Sea, with the crew safe ^[2].

The deadliest incident did not involve a tanker. On 11 August the Egyptian-owned cargo ship Tihamah was hit in the Bab el-Mandeb. Yemen's government said at least six people were killed in a "double-tap strike"; the Houthis made no official comment ^[5]. Al Jazeera said these were the first shipping deaths linked to the group since the Iran war began ^[5].

On 24 August a projectile struck the Bahri-owned very large crude carrier (VLCC) Amzan about 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu. Bahri said the crew was safe, and the Houthis said they had used a ballistic missile ^[6]. Pressure then moved ashore. Lloyd's List Intelligence (LLI) said an attack halted Yanbu crude exports in the week ending 13 September ^[10]. On 1 October a projectile struck inside Yanbu port and briefly stopped a tanker loading ^[11]. On 7 October a container ship operated by CU Lines was fired on off Yemen; the attack was not claimed ^[12].

How much traffic is passing the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez?

Traffic fell after the ban but did not collapse. LLI counted 354 Bab el-Mandeb transits in the week of 13–19 July and 269 in the first week of the ban ^[3]. Between 27 July and 23 August the average was 273 a week, against 319 before the ban, a fall of about 15% ^[7]. By late September the four-week average had recovered to a preliminary 280. That was above January's 257 but below June's 316 ^[10].

Tankers fell much further than other ships. Mainstream tanker transits, excluding the shadow fleet, fell from 91 in the week to 19 July to 53 and then 54 ^[4]. LLI said only one Saudi-linked tanker transited the strait between 20 July and mid-September ^[9]. S&P Global's Commodities at Sea (CAS) data showed 63 VLCC crossings in July, 24 in August and none after 9 September ^[17].

The Suez Canal has gained as traffic moved north. LLI counted 1,234 Suez transits in August and 1,228 in September ^[12]. August was the busiest month since December 2023 ^[9]. September traffic was 21% higher than a year earlier but still 39% below pre-crisis levels ^[12]. Bab el-Mandeb transits reached 1,215 in September, up 16% year on year but 47% below pre-crisis levels ^[12].

How does 2026 compare with the 2023–2025 Red Sea crisis?

Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea began in November 2023, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) ^[13]. By February 2026 more than 100 merchant vessels had been targeted, gCaptain reported. Four were sunk, one seized and at least eight seafarers killed ^[14]. Many shipowners switched to the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope ^[13].

The oil data show the scale of that shift. EIA estimates that oil through the Bab el-Mandeb fell from 9.3 million barrels a day (mb/d) in 2023 to 4.1 mb/d in 2024. It was 4.2 mb/d in the first half of 2025. Over the same periods, flows around the Cape rose from 6.2 mb/d to 9.3 mb/d and then 9.1 mb/d ^[13]. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the strait fell to near zero ^[13].

The 2026 campaign differs in two ways. First, its declared target is Saudi-linked shipping. The Houthis say navigation remains safe for other vessels ^[9]. Second, the Red Sea now carries far more Gulf crude than before, because Saudi Arabia diverted exports from Hormuz to Yanbu ^[1]. Egypt has benefited from the northward shift. Suez Canal revenue fell from a record $10.2bn in 2023 to $4.1bn in 2025. In July 2026 it reached $505m, the highest monthly level since December 2023 ^[15].

Where are cargoes going, and what does rerouting cost?

Most operators now treat southbound Saudi transits of the Bab el-Mandeb as off-limits, S&P Global reported ^[16]. Cargoes for Asia instead leave the Red Sea through Suez and sail around Africa. Andrea Olivi, head of shipping at Trafigura, said that adds "more than 30 days of sailing" ^[16]. Fully laden VLCCs sit too deep for the canal. LLI said VLCCs loading at Yanbu were part-discharging at Ain Sukhna, then topping up at Sidi Kerir via the SUMED pipeline ^[3]. On CAS data, the Suez route carried 58% of Saudi–Asia flows in August, against 5% in July ^[17].

Longer voyages tie up ships and push up rates. Platts put the cost of shipping 270,000 tonnes of crude from Yanbu to the Far East at $66.87 a tonne on 28 July. When the assessment launched in early May it was $32 ^[16]. LLI described a "third VLCC spot-rate spike" since the Gulf crisis began ^[7]. The Platts Global VLCC Index reached a record $970,635 a day on 16 September ^[17]. That index is global, so it also reflects disruption around Hormuz.

Insurance has followed the threat. In late July war-risk premiums for the Bab el-Mandeb were about 0.5% of hull value. Near western Saudi Arabia they were 0.1% ^[18]. The insurers' Joint War Committee extended the Red Sea listed area by around 800 km north. Calls at Jeddah and Yanbu now carry additional premiums ^[3]. Simone Krummaker of Bayes Business School said longer voyages, delays and fuel costs "may have a greater effect than the premium itself" ^[18].

How have navies responded?

The EU's naval mission, Operation Aspides, has been extended to 28 February 2027 with a budget of nearly €15 million ^[14]. Its commander, Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis, told The War Zone that protection requests had risen 39% since February 2026 ^[19]. The mission had facilitated the passage of more than 2,240 merchant vessels and closely protected more than 690 ^[19]. He said the ships recently attacked had not requested protection ^[19].

Capacity is the constraint. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said merchant ships were effectively queuing for escorts because Aspides lacked warships ^[10]. In October she said "the minimum amount that we actually need is 10 ships", and that Belgium was sending new vessels ^[20]. Saudi Arabia has invited about 50 countries to a Multinational Naval Defense Coalition, and 14 had signed up by late July ^[19].

What to watch

• The scope of the ban. The Houthis say only Saudi-linked shipping is targeted; any widening would hit general Red Sea traffic ^[9].
• Escort numbers. Whether EU members provide the ten warships Kallas says are needed ^[20].
• Yanbu and the pipeline. Attacks on the port and on the East-West pipeline have already halted loadings once ^[10,11].
• Suez traffic. Canal transits and revenue show how much trade is shifting north rather than south ^[12,15].
• Insurance terms. Changes to the listed area or premiums would show how underwriters read the risk ^[3,18].

Alupetra tracks tanker freight, chokepoint traffic and crude prices in its daily market coverage from Istanbul, London and Dubai.