Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Bosphorus — Chokepoint Risk in 2026

Hormuz: open on paper, contested in practice

Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz carried 19.87 mb/d of oil in 2025: 14.95 mb/d of crude and condensate and 4.93 mb/d of products. That was roughly 25% of world seaborne oil trade, and about 80% of it went to Asia ^[1]. Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pipelines that can bypass the strait. Before the war, the IEA estimated their available spare capacity at 3.5–5.5 mb/d ^[1].

The crisis began on 28 February. Within days, the main P&I clubs, including Gard, Skuld, NorthStandard, the London P&I Club and the American Club, gave notice cancelling war-risk cover in the region with effect from 5 March ^[2]. Premiums rose to as much as 1% of a ship's value within 48 hours, from about 0.2% the week before ^[2].

Flows have partly recovered since then. The IEA reported that total oil flows through Hormuz rose by 3.7 mb/d to 10.9 mb/d in September, helped by ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. Bypass exports, mainly through Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline, rose by 970 kb/d to 5.6 mb/d ^[3]. Product and LPG shipments have lagged crude: Middle East refined product and LPG exports remain below half of pre-war levels ^[3].

Transit counts are volatile. Lloyd's List Intelligence (LLI) recorded 104 transits by non-Iranian-linked vessels in the week of 5–11 October, including 81 tankers and gas carriers. That was a 17% fall on the previous week but still 31% above the August weekly average ^[4]. LLI counted at least 28 attacks or security incidents in the first half of October, the highest monthly total since the war began. It also noted that Iran had expanded its list of "non-compliant" vessels to 124 ships, and that US Central Command (CENTCOM) said 138 merchant vessels had been redirected under the US blockade of Iranian ports ^[4].

The past week has brought further escalation. On 22 October Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed that seven tankers had been struck, which would be the largest single-day toll since the war began. A CENTCOM spokesperson disputed Iran's claims about mines, said international shipping lanes had been cleared of them, and said that 95% of vessels were getting through ^[5]. According to the IRGC navy, two supertankers carrying more than 4.5 million barrels of crude hit mines south of the strait on 23 October. These claims have not been independently verified ^[6].

The Red Sea: from bypass to battleground

Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast has become the main outlet for crude that would normally leave through Hormuz. According to Kpler data cited by Al Jazeera, Yanbu exported about 4.1 mb/d in June, carrying roughly 64% of the Saudi oil rerouted away from Hormuz ^[8]. Before the war the Bab el-Mandeb was a smaller route: the EIA estimates 4.2 mb/d of oil passed through it in the first half of 2025, down from 9.3 mb/d in 2023 after the earlier Houthi campaign ^[7].

That bypass is now under pressure. The Houthis declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia on 20 July ^[8,9]. Al Jazeera estimated that about 6 mb/d of crude passes the Bab el-Mandeb to Asia, around two-thirds of it Saudi. Kpler estimated that routing a Yanbu cargo to South Korea via Suez and the Cape of Good Hope would lengthen the voyage from about 24 days to about 54 ^[8].

Attacks have since spread to Saudi infrastructure. LLI reported that an attack halted crude exports from Yanbu in the week ending 13 September. Loadings later resumed, with the pipeline running at reduced rates ^[9]. On 1 October a projectile struck inside Yanbu port and briefly halted loading of a tanker ^[10]. In its review of the third quarter, the EIA cited attacks on tankers and on Saudi pipeline pumping stations as factors behind higher prices ^[11]. On 22 October Saudi Aramco ordered the evacuation of its Dhahran headquarters, as Houthi attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure helped push Brent to its highest settlement since April ^[12].

Traffic has held up better than the headlines suggest. LLI counted an average of 280 Bab el-Mandeb transits a week over the four weeks to 27 September, against 316 in June and 257 in January. Suez Canal transits averaged 287 a week ^[9]. Escort capacity is limited, however: the EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, said ships are effectively queuing for Operation Aspides escorts because the mission lacks warships ^[9].

The Turkish Straits: a war next door

The Turkish Straits carried about 3.7 mb/d of oil in the first half of 2025, according to the EIA. Kazakhstan, which exports through the CPC terminal near Novorossiysk, is the largest shipper through the Straits, and Russia's Black Sea ports are a primary outlet for its crude and products ^[7]. Passage continues under the 1936 Montreux Convention ^[15], but the Black Sea war has moved closer to the Straits.

• 26 March: The Turkish-operated tanker Altura, carrying about 1 million barrels of crude from Novorossiysk, was hit about 30 km from the Bosphorus, according to local media. Turkey's transport minister said it was struck by a seaborne drone ^[13].
• 22 July: A drone strike on the Turkish-flagged bulk carrier Reyhan Sarı, reportedly near Novorossiysk, killed one crew member ^[14].
• 8–9 August: Turkey briefly withheld Dardanelles transit permits for some Novorossiysk-bound vessels. Turkish officials told Reuters the steps were temporary, and transits resumed the next day ^[15].
• Late August: Turkey summoned Ukraine's ambassador after attacks on two vessels near Tuapse. Tankers passing the Bosphorus have been seen with nets, water tanks and tyres rigged as improvised anti-drone protection ^[16].

The EIA also listed Ukrainian drone attacks on Novorossiysk among the supply risks behind higher third-quarter prices ^[11]. Citing Reuters, SeaNews Türkiye reported in early August that Black Sea war-risk premiums had risen from about 1% of a ship's value to as much as 2% in roughly two weeks ^[17].

Freight and insurance: the cost of risk

Freight markets have absorbed much of the disruption. In mid-October the Baltic Exchange's TD3C route (270,000 t, Middle East Gulf to China) rose to WS1,318.75, equal to a round-trip time-charter equivalent of about $1.41m/day. The West Africa–China route (TD15) reached WS750.63, or about $763,000/day ^[18]. For Black Sea crude, the TD6 Suezmax route (135,000 t, CPC to Augusta) rose to WS1,008.33, just over $816,600/day, and the Baltic Exchange noted that "available tonnage remains tight" in the Black Sea ^[18]. The IEA said record freight and crude costs had squeezed refining margins in Europe and Asia ^[3].

Insurance costs have moved with the conflict. Marsh's global head of marine told The National in July that Hormuz war-risk rates ranged from 3% to 10% of hull value, compared with about 0.25% before the war. For a $100m tanker, that means $3m–$10m per voyage instead of about $250,000. Rates had fallen after the June memorandum, then rose again when attacks resumed ^[19].

What to watch

Three questions matter most for the coming weeks:

• Hormuz: whether escorted transits can hold up against the rising number of attacks.
• Red Sea: whether the Houthis' conflict with Saudi Arabia spreads from Saudi-linked shipping to wider Red Sea traffic.
• Black Sea: whether drone strikes continue to move closer to the Bosphorus approaches.

Diplomatic contacts are continuing, but freight and insurance markets are still pricing these chokepoints as active risk zones.

Alupetra monitors these routes from its offices in Istanbul, London and Dubai.