TTT and TTV Oil Offers: Why Tank-to-Tank Transfer Deals Are a Red Flag

What does TTT mean in oil trading?

TTT stands for tank-to-tank transfer and TTV for tank-to-vessel. Both describe real operations: oil in a terminal can change hands in the same tank, move to another tank, or be loaded onto a ship or barge. The ICE Low Sulphur Gasoil futures contract, which trades 10ppm diesel, is settled by physical delivery in the Amsterdam–Rotterdam–Antwerp (ARA) area by "in-tank or inter-tank transfer from an Exchange Recognised Customs and Excise bonded storage installation or refinery" ^[1]. QatarEnergy's published sales terms define "Into Tank" and "Ex Tank" transfers between tanks in one facility, and "In Situ" transfers, where title passes while the oil stays put ^[2].

In broker chains, the same letters mean something else. A "TTT procedure" or "TTV oil" offer typically promises discounted diesel, jet fuel or fuel oil already sitting in a famous port, most often Rotterdam. Ferm Seaports (formerly Ferm Rotterdam), which set up the city's storage-spoofing taskforce, has documented offers of "JP54, D2 or D6 – already stored at a facility in Rotterdam", usually for 1 or 2 million barrels ^[3,4]. Offers labelled "EN590" borrow the name of the European diesel standard, which makes them look more technical than they are, but the label says nothing about whether any product exists.

For fake allocations, look-alike domains and payment diversion, see our guide to oil trading scam red flags.

How does a genuine in-tank title transfer work?

A tank terminal stores product for a customer under a contract and acts on that customer's instructions. The general conditions of VOTOB, the Association of Dutch Tank Storage Companies, set out the controls. All instructions must be in writing. The customer must notify the terminal "immediately in writing" of any transfer of ownership, and the new owner must accept the storage terms in writing. The terminal may refuse to recognise a transfer until its own claims are paid, or if title is flawed ^[5]. It gives information about stored goods only to the customer, its legal representative or the holder of a store warrant. The customer may not make tank space available to third parties without written permission ^[5].

Quantity and quality are settled by formal measurement, not a "dip test" sold to a stranger. Under VOTOB terms, the terminal's tank measurements are binding and the customer may attend ^[5]. Under the QatarEnergy terms (issued in 2016 by QPSPP), the seller instructs the terminal operator to prepare and sign quality and quantity certificates for both parties. For tank-to-tank deliveries, the buyer may appoint its own independent inspector, with the storage company's prior agreement and at the buyer's cost ^[2]. The buyer pays within seven days after title and risk pass. If the seller wants security, such as a letter of credit, it must be in place five working days before the transfer ^[2].

LNG terminals work the same way: Floating LNG Terminal Finland's in-tank transfer agreement takes effect only when signed by the terminal operator, transferor and transferee ^[6].

In each case the terminal deals only with its contracted customers, the inspector is paid by the party that wants the inspection, and money moves against title or bank security. Nobody pays a seller for permission to look at a tank.

What does a typical TTT "procedure" offer look like?

Rosneft publishes an example marked on every page "Sample document used by fraudsters" ^[7]. Issued in the name of a Russian gas processing plant and dated 24 July 2019, it offers 1,000,000 barrels of Jet A1 FOB Rotterdam at $56 gross and $54 net per barrel, or $56,000,000 in total. In outline, the procedure runs as follows ^[7]:

1. The buyer sends an irrevocable corporate purchase order (ICPO), company registration and passport page.
2. The seller issues a commercial invoice; the buyer returns it with its tank farm's tank storage agreement (TSA).
3. The buyer pays the tank farm for two days, then three more, to obtain a "5 Days TSR" (tank storage receipt).
4. The seller issues an injection report, a dip test authorisation, authorisations to sell and verify, and an inspection report.
5. The buyer dip-tests and pays the full value by telegraphic transfer; the product is then to be "injected" into its tank.

A buyer who fails to perform is threatened with a penalty of at least $3,000,000 under an "ICC Protective Agreement" ^[7].

Ferm's case files add a twist: the product "has to be transferred to different storage tanks – at short notice", and the seller's "friend" appears with spare capacity "for 3-5 days" ^[4]. Ferm also noted that the offers were priced in barrels, while the Rotterdam storage trade works in tonnes or cubic metres ^[4].

Offers often borrow real names. In June 2017 Lukoil warned of emails offering storage at a "LUKOIL-Trans tank farm in Rotterdam"; LUKOIL-Trans neither owned nor rented any tank farm there ^[8]. Vopak's information security manager told Ferm that forged documents carried addresses such as vopakterminal.com, and that impostors claiming to work for Vopak assured buyers the storage or product existed ^[9].

Where does the money go — the fee trap

This is the core of the tank-to-tank transfer scam. The buyer pays at each stage before anything is independently verified. In the cases Ferm documented, the "friend" with spare storage invoiced $100,000–450,000, payable immediately to obscure banks in another country ^[4]. Because the seller introduces the storage provider, each payment stays inside the scheme.

The Rotterdam taskforce's guidance is direct. Payment for an "Authorization to Verify (ATV)" storage capacity, a "Dip Test Authorization (DTA)" or endorsements from the Port of Rotterdam Authority should be considered wrong by definition ^[10].

A dip test arranged around the seller also proves little. In the Dutch "Barrel" case, men using false names and company clothing posed as authorised inspectors and took unauthorised samples and measurements from storage tanks. Their findings went into reports offering the oil to buyers; seven false reports covered oil with a stated value of $975 million ^[11]. The sampling took place at Shell sites in Pernis and Europoort without the permission of Shell or the inspection company SGS. The reports supported offers of 2 million barrels of crude worth $155 million to the trading company The Commodity Traders (TCT) ^[12]. De Volkskrant obtained footage of a man in fluorescent safety gear, identified as an SGS employee, filling three bottles from a tank valve while another man filmed ^[13]. A suspicious buyer went to the police in July 2021, and no money was paid ^[11].

On 13 March 2026 the Rotterdam District Court convicted four defendants of forgery-related offences, among them a Shell employee and an SGS employee. It acquitted the two men who drafted the reports of attempted fraud, finding no proof that they directly intended to make TCT pay ^[12].

What do terminals, ports and inspectors say?

The Port of Rotterdam Authority says the first storage-spoofing cases date back about 15 years; some have ended with tank trucks arriving at terminals to collect products that do not exist. The taskforce, now run with VOTOB, TCT and the Seaport Police, keeps a blacklist of more than 1,250 fraudulent domains and says it prevents fraud cases every day ^[14]. De Volkskrant found 421 fraudulent websites: over 40% registered in the United States and about 30% in Russia ^[13].

Terminal operators repeat the message. VTTI says it is not involved in any business relating to "Jet Fuel 54" and that documents claiming such a transaction are fraudulent ^[15]. Advario warns that impostors use its name, terminal names and logos with false documentation to seek payments ^[16].

The taskforce advises buyers to ask for an official quality and quantity report from an inspection company working in the port, such as SGS or Intertek, and an injection report from the storage company. Without these, it says, the deal "is a red flag for a potential scam". Companies operating in Rotterdam should also have a Dutch Chamber of Commerce (KVK) registration ^[10].

Inspectors offer their own checks. SGS verifies documents that carry its name free of charge ^[17]. It needs a full copy: a report number alone is not enough, and customer service hotlines cannot verify reports ^[18].

How to check a TTT or TTV offer (checklist)

• Contact the terminal yourself, using details from its own channels or the taskforce whitelist, not the offer ^[3,14].
• Expect a genuine transfer to involve the terminal: written instructions from the owner and your written acceptance of its terms ^[5].
• Appoint and pay your own inspector, and verify every report with the issuing company ^[2,17].
• Refuse fees for paper. No payments for ATV, DTA, storage receipts, injection agreements, endorsements or storage extensions ^[10].
• Test the product name and units. Ferm says JP54 does not exist; barrel quotes for products stored in tonnes deserve questions ^[4,15].
• Pay against title or bank security, as published in-tank terms provide ^[2].
• Run KYC on every party in the chain, including the KVK registration of any "Rotterdam" logistics company ^[10].
• Report attempts even if you paid nothing. The Barrel case began with a buyer's police report ^[11].

Alupetra applies these checks in its KYC, due diligence and crude oil sales advisory work from its Istanbul, London and Dubai offices.