Oil Trading Scams — The Red Flags Every Buyer Should Know

What do oil trading scams look like?

Most oil trading scams are advance-fee frauds. A "seller" offers a cargo it does not own, then asks the buyer to pay something first: a commission, a document fee, a storage charge or an inspection "authorisation". Once the money arrives, the seller disappears ^[3,13].

The losses are real. The Port of Rotterdam Authority estimates that "storage spoofing", the sale of non-existent tank capacity and stocks, costs traders at least €10 million a year, counting only known payments. Deals with a combined offered value of €2.5 billion were reported to its taskforce in 2025 ^[1]. In February 2026 the first tank storage spoofing case came before a Rotterdam court. Prosecutors alleged that the suspects produced false inspection reports for about 2 million barrels of oil, valued at $155 million, that did not exist ^[2].

High prices make the bait more tempting. Wholesale diesel reached all-time highs of around $220/bbl in Europe and the United States in 2026, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA) ^[18]. In that market, a "discounted" diesel or jet fuel offer deserves more scrutiny, not less.

How do fake crude allocations and refiner impersonation work?

Many scams borrow the name of a national oil company. In 2017 Nigeria's NNPC warned that fraudsters were circulating fake crude allocation letters that misused senior officials' names and demanded cash deposits as "commission" on the volumes ^[11]. Mele Kyari, then head of its crude marketing division, said "Everything about crude sale is electronic and real time" ^[11]. He explained that genuine buyers are screened through an advertised process and sign a single annual contract, typically for 30,000–32,000 barrels per day, not the "two to three million bpd" that scammers promote ^[10]. NNPC also said it "does not sell crude oil from hotel rooms" ^[10]. As early as 2014 it noted that its list of approved term-contract offtakers had been widely publicised, and urged the public to use it to avoid being duped ^[12]. In 2025, NNPC Ltd said legitimate engagements occur "strictly through official channels or business units only" ^[15].

Gulf producers report similar abuse. Saudi Aramco says impersonation attempts using fake email domains and social media, including LinkedIn, X and WhatsApp, have risen sharply. It adds that it never offers to buy or sell products through barter on social media or WhatsApp ^[8]. ADNOC warns of people posing as its representatives to offer supply contracts or investments, often for a fee, and states: "ADNOC will never ask for money from a third party" ^[9]. Lukoil has denounced fraudulent commercial offers made in the names of independent members of its board ^[14]. RussNeft describes look-alike email addresses, forged certificates and prepayment demands, after which the "pseudo sellers disappear" ^[13].

Why are EN590, D2 and JP54 spot offers a classic scam vector?

The most common bait is an unsolicited "spot" offer of diesel or jet fuel said to be sitting in a famous port. These offers follow a template. FERM (now Ferm Seaports), which set up the Rotterdam storage-spoofing taskforce in 2017 ^[1], documented offers of about 1 or 2 million barrels of "JP54" jet fuel or "D2" diesel at attractive prices, supposedly stored in Rotterdam ^[3]. It describes JP54 as typically a fake label for Jet A-1 ^[3]. Terminal operator VTTI states that it "is not involved in any business relating to Jet Fuel 54" and that documents claiming such a transaction are fraudulent ^[7]. Offers quoting EN590, a genuine European diesel specification, follow the same pattern; a real product name proves nothing.

The template works because it borrows credibility. The product is familiar, the volumes promise large margins, and the location points to real terminals. The Rotterdam taskforce says fraudsters copy public information about real companies, so fake websites are hard to tell from genuine ones ^[1]. NNPC's account of its own sales process, with screened buyers and formal annual contracts, shows how far these offers are from how producers actually sell ^[10].

The procedure trap: fees for documents, dip tests and storage

The "procedure" attached to these offers makes the buyer pay before the seller proves anything. In Rotterdam cases documented by FERM, the seller first said the product had to be moved to other tanks. A third party then appeared with spare storage for a few days and invoiced the buyer immediately for "storage facilitation", typically $100,000–$450,000, payable to obscure foreign banks ^[4].

The taskforce's guidance is blunt. Any deal requiring the buyer to pay upfront, for document endorsement, tank farm access or storage extension, should be treated with caution. Payment for an "Authorization to Verify" storage capacity or a "Dip Test Authorization" should be considered "wrong by definition". A genuine offer should come with an official quality and quantity report from an inspection company working in the port, such as SGS or Intertek, and an injection report from the storage company ^[6].

Documents alone prove little. The ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has reported unsolicited offers of cargoes said to be aboard ships that were in fact far away, and charter offers for ships that had been scrapped or renamed. It urges parties "to exercise extreme caution, particularly when an advance fee is requested" ^[17].

How do look-alike domains and payment diversion work?

A second family of scams targets genuine deals. In 2015 fraudsters used an email address differing by a few characters from that of India's ONGC. Posing as ONGC, they told Saudi Aramco to pay for naphtha cargoes into a bank account in Bangkok instead of ONGC's usual account. Aramco said the attempt was foiled, with no financial impact on either company ^[16].

Fraudsters also harvest material for future scams. VTTI warns that impostors' contracts may look normal but aim "to obtain invoices and or email confirmations that could be used illegally in future business deals" ^[7]. Its warning signs include free webmail addresses, mobile numbers instead of official company lines, requests for up-front fees, early requests for financial details and pressure to act fast ^[7]. FERM adds website checks: a recently registered domain, a registrant in an unexpected country, a "Rotterdam" company without a Rotterdam phone number, and names that differ between a site's address and its pages. A padlock icon (HTTPS) is not proof of legitimacy ^[5].

How can buyers protect themselves from oil trading scams?

• Never pay to see the oil. No fees for allocations, document endorsement, verification, dip tests or storage facilitation ^[6].
• Verify through channels you find yourself. If an offer names a real terminal, contact that terminal directly ^[3].
• Check websites and domains against the Rotterdam taskforce's blacklist and whitelist before engaging ^[1].
• Book your own inspection with an established inspector, and ask for quality, quantity and injection reports ^[6].
• Treat megavolumes and deep discounts as red flags, especially for "JP54" or "D2" offers ^[3,10].
• Confirm any change of bank details by phone on a number you already hold ^[16].
• Run full KYC before signing: company registry, beneficial owners and sanctions screening.
• Pay through banks against documents, never by advance transfer to an account the seller nominates.

Where should you report a suspected oil trading scam?

Report impersonation to the company concerned. ADNOC asks people to email its compliance team and to consider notifying local police ^[9]. Aramco publishes dedicated addresses for suspicious messages ^[8]. Suspicious Rotterdam storage websites can go to the storage-spoofing taskforce, whose members include the Seaport Police and which works with the Dutch domain registry SIDN to take fraudulent .nl sites offline ^[1]. The IMB asks shipowners whose vessel names are misused to report it, so records can help others and support court cases ^[17]. If money has already left, contact your bank at once and report the fraud to police where you are based ^[13].

Alupetra applies these red-flag checks in its KYC and due diligence work from its Istanbul, London and Dubai offices.