China’s Global Energy Investments: Upstream Stakes, LNG Deals and Pipelines

How much is China investing in energy abroad?

China energy investment abroad has changed shape over the past two decades. Between 2000 and 2020, China's two policy banks, China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, provided roughly $245.8 billion of energy finance to foreign governments, according to Boston University's Global Development Policy Center ^[4]. Today much of the activity is tracked through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) deals: equity investments by Chinese companies and construction contracts won by Chinese firms.

On that measure, 2025 was a record year. Christoph Nedopil of the Griffith Asia Institute estimated total BRI engagement at USD 213.5 billion in about 350 deals, made up of USD 128.4 billion of construction contracts and USD 85.2 billion of investment ^[1]. Energy accounted for about USD 93.9 billion, more than double the 2024 level. Fossil fuels made up over 74% of energy engagement, and the report's key findings put oil and gas at about USD 71.5 billion ^[1]. Green energy and hydropower reached about USD 21.4 billion, also a record ^[1]. The author describes the figures as preliminary, based on his own data collection ^[1].

The first half of 2026 looked different. The follow-up report, published in July by the University of Queensland with the Green Finance & Development Center (GFDC) in Shanghai, counted USD 126.4 billion of engagement in about 186 deals, a record for any first half ^[2]. Energy engagement was about USD 36.3 billion, and 56% of it was green, a new record in both absolute and relative terms ^[2,3]. Gas engagement fell to USD 14 billion from USD 23.3 billion a year earlier, and oil to USD 1.9 billion from USD 6.9 billion ^[2].

Where do Chinese companies hold upstream stakes?

China's three national oil companies are China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). Together with other Chinese firms, they hold or are building upstream and gas positions in several regions. Reported examples include:

• Russia: CNPC owns 20% of Novatek's Yamal LNG project, and China's Silk Road Fund holds 9.9% ^[6].
• Middle East: Under its 2023 supply deal, CNPC took a 5% interest in the equivalent of one North Field East train, which has a capacity of 8 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) ^[8].
• Latin America: CNOOC brought Brazil's Buzios 8 project on stream in the first half of 2026 and acquired its first operated exploration block in the pre-salt Santos Basin ^[5]. Group output reached a record 398.7 million barrels of oil equivalent, up 3.7% ^[5].
• Africa: The 2025 BRI report highlighted a USD 23 billion oil and gas development agreement between the Republic of Congo and Southern Petrochemical Group Yonghua, aiming to raise output from three blocks to 200,000 barrels per day by 2030. In Nigeria, China National Chemical Engineering won construction contracts worth about USD 20 billion at a gas industrial park ^[1].
• Central Asia: The 2026 H1 report listed a USD 3.9 billion investment to explore a new gas field in Kazakhstan ^[2].

Which long-term LNG contracts have Chinese buyers signed?

Long-term contracts with Gulf producers sit at the centre of China's LNG supply. In November 2022 Sinopec signed a 27-year agreement with QatarEnergy to buy 4 million tonnes of LNG a year from the North Field East expansion, starting in 2026. Citing BloombergNEF data, Gulf News called it China's longest LNG supply deal to date ^[7]. In June 2023 CNPC signed a 27-year deal for the same annual volume, delivered to its receiving terminals in China ^[8].

Chinese buyers have also signed with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). In April 2025 CNOOC agreed a five-year deal for 500,000 tonnes a year from 2026. It was ADNOC's third contract with Chinese buyers that weekend, after ENN and Zhenhua Oil ^[9]. The deals came as tariffs disrupted trade with the United States. China imported no US LNG in March 2025, according to Kpler and LSEG data, after the US supplied about 5% of China's LNG in 2024 ^[9].

The 2026 crisis exposed how concentrated this portfolio is. In March, the Brussels think tank Bruegel noted that China sources about half of its crude and 30% of its LNG from suppliers including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE and Qatar ^[15]. The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported damage to gas infrastructure including Ras Laffan in Qatar, the world's largest liquefaction facility ^[10]. China's LNG imports fell 12%, or 3 billion cubic metres (bcm), year on year between March and June, partly because domestic gas production was stronger. Chinese gas demand fell by an estimated 4% over the same period ^[10].

How important are cross-border pipelines?

Pipelines give China supply that avoids maritime chokepoints. Kpler estimated China's pipeline gas imports at 80.7 bcm in 2025, including about 39.2 bcm from Russia via Power of Siberia and about 36 bcm from Central Asia ^[13].

Russia. Gazprom began deliveries through Power of Siberia in 2019 under a long-term contract with CNPC. The companies have agreed to raise flows from 38 bcm to 44 bcm a year. They also agreed to lift the Far Eastern route, which is under construction, from 10 bcm to 12 bcm a year, and Gazprom says supplies on that route will begin in January 2027 ^[11]. In 2025 Gazprom signed a legally binding memorandum on Power of Siberia 2, a 50 bcm a year line through Mongolia ^[11]. In September 2026 Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said Russia planned to supply 50 bcm of gas to China in 2026. He said talks on the second line, renamed Power of Baikal, were continuing ^[12].

Central Asia. The Central Asia–China gas pipeline carries around 55 bcm a year through its three lines. A proposed Line D through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan would add 25–30 bcm a year, but it has faced delays since 2014 ^[14]. After talks in Turkmenistan in mid-April 2026, Türkmengaz signed a $4.6 billion contract with CNPC to build facilities for Phase 4 of the Galkynysh gas field. The plant will be able to process up to 10 bcm a year ^[14].

How has the 2026 crisis changed China's priorities?

The Gulf disruption cut China's crude imports sharply. They averaged 8.1 million barrels per day (b/d) in the second quarter of 2026, about 32% lower than in the first quarter, according to US Energy Information Administration data cited by Al Jazeera ^[16]. Russia, which supplied about 20% of China's crude imports in 2025, has become more important. Seaborne imports from Russia reached 1.68 million b/d in August, according to Kpler, and about 1 million b/d more arrives by pipeline ^[16].

Overseas engagement patterns have also moved. BRI construction engagement in the Middle East reached a record USD 36.5 billion in the first half of 2026, up 98.4%. Construction engagement in Central Asia rose 174% to USD 13.2 billion ^[2]. The report links "the fossil fuel volatility driven by the Strait of Hormuz crisis" to possible openings for green energy, manufacturing and mining deals ^[2]. The report expects Chinese BRI engagement to keep growing strongly through 2026 ^[2].

Three shifts stand out from the reported data:

• More overland supply: larger Russian pipeline volumes, the 2027 Far Eastern route and new Central Asian gas capacity ^[11,14].
• A greener overseas mix: green projects took the majority of BRI energy engagement for the first time, while oil and gas deal values fell ^[2].
• Steady upstream spending: CNOOC kept its 2026 capital budget at RMB 112–122 billion and its production target at 780–800 million barrels of oil equivalent ^[5].

What to watch

• Power of Baikal: whether Gazprom and CNPC agree price and timing for the 50 bcm line ^[11,12].
• Qatari supply: when North Field East volumes reach Sinopec and CNPC as Ras Laffan recovers ^[7,8,10].
• Belt and Road data for 2026: whether oil and gas engagement recovers in the second half ^[2].
• Central Asia: progress on Line D and the Galkynysh expansion ^[14].
• LNG demand: whether stronger domestic gas output keeps limiting Chinese LNG imports ^[10,13].

Alupetra follows Chinese energy investment and LNG trade flows from its offices in Istanbul, London and Dubai.