China’s Energy Security 2026: Oil Stockpiles, Imports and Diversification

How much crude does China import, and from where?

China is the world's largest crude importer, and its energy security strategy rests on storage, diversified suppliers and domestic production ^[3]. Official data cited by Reuters show imports of 557.73 million tonnes in 2025, or 11.55 million barrels per day (b/d), a record and 4.4% more than in 2024. December alone averaged 13.18 million b/d ^[2].

A large share of that oil came through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the strait carried almost 15 million b/d of crude and condensate in 2025, about 34% of global crude trade. China and India together received 44% of those crude flows ^[1].

The war that began at the end of February cut that route sharply. The IEA said Hormuz flows fell from around 20 million b/d of crude and products before the conflict to an average of 2.7 million b/d in March to May ^[4]. China's crude imports fell by 40%, or 4.6 million b/d, between February and May ^[4], and its seaborne imports reached a low of 6 million b/d in June ^[7]. Official figures put imports at 11.79 million b/d in March, 8.93 million b/d in August and 9.03 million b/d in September ^[8].

How large are China's oil stockpiles?

China does not publish its stock levels, so all figures are estimates ^[8]. Its government stockpiles include dedicated strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) sites built before 2019 and newer "commercial reserves", which state refiners can rotate more flexibly. Reuters reported that a law passed in January 2025 placed both under a single definition of national reserves ^[3].

Stockbuilding accelerated before the war. Reuters reported in October 2025 that state companies would add at least 169 million barrels of storage at 11 sites during 2025 and 2026. Two trade sources said Beijing's goal was six months of imports, roughly 2 billion barrels ^[3]. The IEA noted that the global surplus of more than 2 million b/d in the second half of 2025 led to large stock builds, "most notably in China" ^[7].

Estimates vary. In May, the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) put total Chinese crude stocks at 1.1–1.3 billion barrels. That includes about 100 million barrels in underground caverns, mostly strategic, which satellites cannot see ^[5]. Data from EA Crude Oil Inventories show onshore stocks at a record 1.354 billion barrels on 4 May and 1.192 billion barrels in the week to 19 October. That is only 13 million barrels below a year earlier ^[8]. Kpler estimated that China still held 1,124 million barrels in mid-October, about 80 days of refinery crude requirements ^[9].

How did China respond to the Gulf disruption?

Beijing's first response was to reduce demand for crude rather than release reserves. In March, Sinopec cut refinery runs pre-emptively and the government banned refined product exports. According to OIES, refiners' requests to tap the SPR were reportedly refused, and an SPR release is seen as a last resort ^[5]. In April, Beijing granted extra crude import quotas for sanctioned crudes and told independent refiners in Shandong to keep gasoline and diesel output at 2024–2025 levels ^[5].

Commercial stocks came next. Energy Aspects, citing Kayrros satellite data, said China began drawing in May and drew almost 25 million barrels in the month to 7 June. Analysts at Vortexa, Kpler and Energy Aspects expected draws of about 1 million b/d ^[6]. Kpler said Beijing kept adding to its SPR during the war, while refiners relied more on commercial stocks ^[6].

Lower demand also helped. In mid-September the IEA said apparent Chinese demand over the previous six months was 1.7 million b/d below February levels, the largest decline of any market ^[7]. Vortexa estimated that rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) contributed to a fall of about 1 million b/d in fuel demand in the second quarter ^[6].

Estimates of the September draw differ. Reuters columnist Clyde Russell, who subtracts refinery runs from imports plus domestic output, calculated an implied draw of about 530,000 b/d, after 640,000 b/d in August. By his calculation, China still had a small crude surplus of 240,000 b/d over the first nine months ^[8]. Kpler's own inventory data show onshore stocks falling by about 1.6 million b/d in September, the fastest pace on record. It said the draws were concentrated in commercial stocks and that "strategic reserves have remained largely untouched" ^[9].

Russia, Brazil and pipelines: who filled the gap?

Russia gained most. Energy Intelligence calculated that its share of China's crude imports reached a record 29.2% in June ^[11]. Chinese customs data reported by Reuters show September imports of 9.94 million tonnes from Russia (about 2.42 million b/d), up 20% year on year. Brazil supplied 5.15 million tonnes (about 1.25 million b/d), up 18%. Imports from Saudi Arabia fell 62% year on year to 2.70 million tonnes. Over January to September, Brazil overtook Saudi Arabia as China's second-largest supplier ^[10]. OIES noted that Chinese buyers had also picked up West African grades ^[5].

Short-haul Russian crude became more valuable. Kpler reported in August that demand for ESPO crude from Russia's Pacific coast had surged. September and October cargoes sold at about ICE Brent plus $1/bbl, against about Brent minus $4/bbl in mid-July. ESPO cargoes can reach China in under a week ^[12].

Pipelines provide a base load that does not depend on Gulf shipping. OIES put pipeline supply from Russia and Kazakhstan at about 1.1 million b/d, based on Russian and Kazakh customs data ^[5]. Kpler assumes about 800,000 b/d ^[9]. The Kazakhstan–China pipeline, operating since 2006, has capacity of about 20 million tonnes a year, or roughly 400,000 b/d ^[13]. The 771 km pipeline from Myanmar's Made Island to Yunnan, opened in 2017 with capacity of 22 million tonnes a year, was designed to carry Middle East crude without relying on shipping routes through the Malacca Strait ^[14]. Because it is supplied by tanker, it diversifies the route rather than the origin of the crude.

Gulf barrels are now returning. Kpler estimated that Chinese firms had secured at least 80 million barrels of Saudi crude loading from September to November through spot trades, after Saudi imports averaged about 20 million barrels a month in the third quarter. Independent refiners have also bought more Russian, Canadian and Middle Eastern crude. Kpler said replacing about 1 million b/d of Iranian supply would be difficult ^[9].

Import quotas and refinery policy

China controls crude buying by independent refiners through import quotas. The commerce ministry set the 2026 quota for non-state trade at 257 million tonnes, unchanged from 2025. A first batch of about 8 million tonnes went to 21 refiners in November 2025 ^[15]. The extra quotas for sanctioned crudes granted in April added to that allocation ^[5].

Product export policy has acted as a second lever. After the March ban, exports were allowed again from the end of April ^[5]. Beijing allowed nearly 3 million tonnes of additional clean product exports in August ^[12], and Kpler noted adjustments to the October export programme ^[9].

Refinery runs are recovering. Official data show throughput of 13.99 million b/d in September, the most since March ^[8]. Kpler expects 14.2 million b/d by December ^[9].

What do China's oil stockpiles mean for global balances?

China's restraint eased the global shortage. The IEA said lower Chinese imports reduced pressure on other Asian crude importers. Global observed stocks were 507 million barrels lower than before the war, and non-OECD crude stocks accounted for 105 million barrels of that fall. About 65% of that came from above-ground tanks in China ^[7].

The next phase depends on restocking. Kpler estimates that seaborne imports would need to rise by about 1 million b/d from September levels to stabilise Chinese inventories by December. It expects imports to recover by less than refinery demand, so draws are likely to continue ^[9]. Russell expects October imports to exceed 10 million b/d, the most since March ^[8]. Energy Aspects said in June that sizeable state buying would need government authorisation, depending on Beijing's view of Hormuz ^[6].

For other buyers, the outcome cuts both ways. Strong Chinese restocking would absorb barrels as Gulf output recovers and support the Dubai price structure ^[9]. Continued draws would keep China's import demand lower for longer.

What to watch

• Monthly customs data: whether October imports top 10 million b/d ^[8].
• Inventory data: weekly onshore stock estimates and any sign that strategic barrels are being used ^[8,9].
• Replenishment rules: whether Beijing sets stock replenishment requirements for the fourth quarter or early 2027 ^[9].
• Quotas: the 2027 non-state crude import quota and further product export decisions ^[9,15].
• Supplier mix: Russian, Brazilian and Saudi volumes as Gulf exports recover ^[10].

Alupetra follows Chinese crude import and inventory data from its offices in Istanbul, London and Dubai.